How Much Does the Senate Health Bill Cost?

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid unveiled his health bill yesterday. As everyone knows by now, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the bill would spend $848 billion to expand coverage over the next ten years, reducing the number of uninsured in 2019 by about 31 million. (The House bill would spend $1.05 trillion over the next ten years, and would reduce the number of uninsured in 2019 by about 36 million.)

As regular readers know, CBO reports two estimates of the cost of expanding coverage: the gross cost, which reflects all new spending and tax incentives to increase insurance coverage, and the net cost, which subtracts any tax revenue increases associated with coverage policies. Leader Reid, Finance Chair Baucus, and their Senate colleagues deserve credit for emphasizing the higher figure in explaining the cost of their bill. In contrast, House leaders tried to focus attention on the lower, net cost of their bill, which led to unnecessary confusion (nb: the net coverage cost of the Senate bill is $599 billion versus $891 billion for the House bill.)

Everyone following this debate should keep in mind, however, that even the gross coverage figures do not capture all the costs of these bills. As I’ve pointed out several times (e.g., here and here), the health bills include many important provisions in addition to those expanding coverage. Many of those non-coverage provisions are intended to save money and thus pay for the coverage expansions. But some of the provisions expand spending on other health programs.

To get a fair read on the total cost of the health bills, we should therefore add together the gross cost of coverage expansions and the cost of the other provisions that increase spending (or decrease revenues). I estimate, for example, the real gross cost of the Senate health bill is $940 billion over ten years:
As noted in the table, the biggest non-coverage items are new discounts for drug purchases in the Medicare Part D program, a new fund to finance efforts in prevention and public health, and a one-year doctor “fix”. Together with other provisions, they add up to a bit more than $90 billion in additional spending, Along with about $1 billion in tax reductions, that means the bill costs $940 billion over ten years, about $92 billion more than for coverage alone. (In contrast, the House bill has a total cost that’s up near $1.3 trillion.)

Caveats: CBO does not calculate a total cost figure for the health bills. The bills include dozens of policy changes, and it would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to allocate all their impacts to specific provisions. Thus, my figures should be considered approximate. I calculated the $90 billion figure for additional spending by adding up all the individual line items in Table 4 of the cost estimate that increased direct spending, with a couple of exceptions. First, I did not include the interaction effects that CBO lists as the end of the estimate because I was not sure how to allocate them; the interactions are large and could have a material effect on my estimate, potentially up or down. Second, there was one policy that led to both spending increases and spending decreases; I included the net spending increase in my figure. I am certainly open to other suggestions about how to add up the other spending in the bill. It’s also worth noting that I have taken as given CBO’s estimate of the gross cost of expanding coverage. There are some nuances in the calculation of that figure (e.g., the treatment of payments in a reinsurance program) that I need to understand better.

Health Care Potpourri

1. The Medicare doctor fix has gotten cheaper. Yesterday the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a cost estimate for the House proposal to make a permanent “fix” to the rates that Medicare pays doctors (as you may recall, those rates are scheduled to be cut by more than 20% at the end of the year). The ten-year price tag? $210 billion. That’s down from the earlier $245 billion cost because of an arcane change in Medicare regulations (in addition, it’s now being scored separate from other parts of health reform).

2. The House Republican alternative to the House bill would cost much less, but cover many fewer people. According to another cost estimate released yesterday, CBO estimates that the Republican alternative would spend $61 billion over ten years on expanding coverage versus $1.055 trillion in the House bill. In return, their proposal would reduce the number of uninsured by 3 million in 2019 versus 36 million under the House bill.

3. Over at EconomistMom, Diane Lim Rogers has a nice piece about some of the tax increases that the House bill would use to pay for health care reform. Her concern? That they look a lot like the tax increases currently scheduled under the alternative minimum tax. Congress always steps in to prevent the AMT from biting more deeply. Why would things be different with a new AMT-like tax?

4. Confused by all the different cost measures being thrown around in the health debate? Over at e21 (the new think tank), I’ve tried to provide some clarity about the leading measures and how they stack up for the House bill and the Senate Finance bill: “How much do the health bills really cost?

Yes, the House Health Bill Costs More than $1.2 Trillion

In a series of posts last week, I noted that the coverage provisions in the House health bill would cost more than $1 trillion over the next ten years, notably higher than the $894 billion figure that was circulated when the bill was first released. In addition, I pointed out that the bill includes other spending increases that aren’t involved in expanding coverage; when you factor those in, I estimated that the real cost of the bill would be almost $1.3 trillion.

I am not alone in this conclusion. According to David Espo of the Associated Press:

The health care bill headed for a vote in the House this week costs $1.2 trillion or more over a decade, according to numerous Democratic officials and figures contained in an analysis by congressional budget experts, far higher than the $900 billion cited by President Barack Obama as a price tag for his reform plan.

While the Congressional Budget Office has put the cost of expanding coverage in the legislation at roughly $1 trillion, Democrats added billions more on higher spending for public health, a reinsurance program to hold down retiree health costs, payments for preventive services and more.

Many of the additions are designed to improve benefits or ease access to coverage in government programs. The officials who provided overall cost estimates did so on condition of anonymity, saying they were not authorized to discuss them.

My own calculation came in at $1.27 trillion, which strikes me as “almost $1.3 trillion” rather than “$1.2 trillion or more”, but that’s nit-picking.

The key point is that there’s a consensus, at least behind the scenes, that the bill would cost more than $1.2 trillion over the next ten years.

 

The Costs of the Health Bills: Another Look

The Congressional Budget Office released a very helpful letter today that clarifies some of its thinking about the budget impacts of the health bills now pending in Congress. Most importantly, CBO offers a new metric for evaluating the health bills: how they affect the federal government’s budgetary commitment to health care. That’s a very useful metric because it reflects not only government spending on health care, but also the various tax subsidies (most notably for employer-sponsored health insurance) that the government provides.

CBO concludes that the House bill would increase the federal commitment to health care by seven times as much as would the Senate Finance Committee bill ($598 billion vs. $85 billion over ten years):

The top line in the table reflects the gross costs of the coverage expansions in each bill. As I noted yesterday, the correct figure for the House bill is $1.055 trillion. There was some confusion about this at first, but most commentators now appear to be referencing this figure (see this nice NYT piece discussing the confusion).

There are two additions I would make to this table:

  • First, as I discussed yesterday and a few weeks ago, I think policy makers should unpack the second line item, changes in net spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs. That line includes not only spending reductions but also important spending increases. Based on the individual line items in the two cost estimates, I estimate that those spending expansions are about $75 billion in the Senate Finance bill and about $217 billion in the House bill. As a result, I think the gross costs of the two bills are around $904 billion and $1.272 trillion, respectively. (But see the caveat below.)
  • Second, the House bill includes the CLASS Act, whose budget accounting is misleading. As I discussed several months ago, the CLASS Act would create an insurance program for long-term care. It’s intended to be budget-neutral in the long-run, but premiums start faster and more robustly than do benefit payments. As a result, this budget-neutral proposal narrows the deficit by $72 billion over the next ten years, but then increases the deficit by a comparable amount in subsequent years. A better accounting would net this out, leaving the House bill with a deficit reduction of $32 billion over the next ten years, rather than $104 billion. (Speaker Pelosi and her team deserve credit for being very transparent on this point; the side-by-side they distributed comparing the bill to an earlier one highlights this issue in the very first entry, and some proponents of the bill have indeed referred to it as saving about $30 billion over ten years.)

Caveat: As I’ve previously noted, it’s difficult to get a precise estimate of the additional gross health spending in the bills because the plethora of provisions interact with one another. As a result, CBO reports some major cost impacts–including both deficit reducers and deficit increasers–as interactions that aren’t attributed to individual line items. In principle, those interactions could cause my $75 billion and $217 billion figures to be higher or lower. CBO briefly addresses this issue in today’s letter, noting: “The reductions in net spending for those programs could themselves be divided into provisions that would increase spending (and thus the federal budgetary commitment to health care) and provisions that would decrease spending (and thus that commitment). However, even some individual provisions of the proposal have elements that raise costs and elements that lower costs. Tabulating all of the aspects of the proposal that would, in isolation, increase federal outlays would be complicated and would require somewhat arbitrary judgments about how to allocate interactions among different elements of individual provisions and interactions among provisions.” I certainly agree. However, I also believe that it is important for everyone involved in this debate to remember that these other provisions are in there. And so, in the absence of more precise figures, I think the $75 billion and $217 billion figures are the best we can do.


The House Health Bill Costs Almost $1.3 Trillion

As I’ve noted in a series of posts, there is often great confusion about the cost of the health bill being considered by Congress.

Yesterday, for example, many commentators were saying that the coverage expansions in the new House health bill would cost $894 billion over ten years, even though the actual cost is $1.055 trillion (according, as always, to the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office).

A second problem is confusion between (a) the cost of expanding coverage and (b) the overall cost of the bills. Expanding coverage is the key focus of each of the major health bills, but we should always keep in mind that the bills make other changes as well. In the case of the Baucus bill, for example, I estimated that other spending initiatives added about $75 billion, bringing its total cost to slightly more than $900 billion.

I’ve made the same calculations for the House health bill, and the additional spending is even larger: about $217 billion. Among many other things, that spending would increase payment rates for primary care physicians in Medicaid and create two new funds to finance public health investments and prevention and wellness efforts. The bill would also extend a provision in the recent stimulus bill (ARRA) that increased the federal share (the FMAP) of Medicaid spending, and thus provided assistance to the states:

As noted, the House bill does not include any funding to prevent the upcoming 20%+ cut in payment rates for doctors in Medicare. The Baucus bill included a one-year fix at a cost of $11 billion, while the Senate’s efforts to pass a permanent fix without paying for it recently failed (thankfully).

P.S. Kudos to David Espo of the Associated Press for covering the cost of the House bill correctly. He wrote: “The Congressional Budget Office said the cost of additional coverage alone was slightly more [than] $1 trillion over a decade. But that omitted other items, including billions for disease prevention programs.”

Note on the numbers: The increases in other health spending programs are sprinkled throughout CBO’s analysis of the bill. I calculated the $217 billion figure by adding up all the individual line items that increased direct spending, with a couple of exceptions. First, I did not include the interaction effects that CBO lists as the end of the estimate because I was not sure how to allocate them; the interactions are large and could have a material effect on my estimate, potentially up or down. Second, there was one policy that led to both spending increases and spending decreases; since the decreases were larger, I didn’t include any of the increases in my figure. I am certainly open to other suggestions about how to add up the other spending in the bill.

Doesn’t the House Bill Fail the President’s $900 Billion Test?

This morning Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi released the latest version of the House health bill. And this afternoon, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its preliminary analysis of the budget impacts of the bill.

One of the key findings of that analysis is that the coverage expansions in the bill would cost $1.055 trillion over the next ten years. And that would seem to imply that the bill fails one of President Obama’s key litmus tests, namely that the total cost be less than $900 billion.

As best I can tell, however, you won’t find that figure or interpretation in any of the initial media coverage. Instead, everyone is reporting that CBO concluded that the bill cost $894 billion and, therefore, that it appears to meet the $900 billion test. For example:

  • The Wall Street Journal: “House legislation to overhaul the health-care system, unveiled Thursday, includes a compromise version of a public insurance option and carries an overall cost of $894 billion over 10 years, House aides said.”
  • The New York Times: “House Democrats on Thursday unveiled an $894 billion package to remake the health care system.”
  • The Washington Post:”The House legislation aims to provide health insurance of one form or another to 96 percent of all Americans at an expected cost of just below $900 billion over 10 years.”

Why does my interpretation differ so much from the media’s? I can see only two possibilities. Either (a) the media have been snookered by proponents of the bill or (b) I missed the memo about how the policy community decided to change how costs are measured. (If it’s (b), please let me know so I can catch up.)

The issue here is the difference between the gross and net costs of expanding coverage. As CBO summarizes it (with my emphasis added):

The estimate includes a projected net cost of $894 billion over 10 years for the proposed expansions in insurance coverage. That net cost itself reflects a gross total of $1,055 billion in subsidies provided through the exchanges (and related spending), increased net outlays for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and tax credits for small employers; those costs are partly offset by $167 billion in collections of penalties paid by individuals and employers. On balance, other effects on revenues and outlays associated with the coverage provisions add $6 billion to their total cost.

I had been under the impression that everyone was using the gross cost measure when discussing the cost of expanding coverage. And I wasn’t alone. When the Baucus bill was released earlier this month, everyone (including each of the newspapers I linked to above) referred to it by its gross price tag ($829 billion), not its net ($518 billion), and said things like the Baucus bill “would cost $829 billion over the next 10 years — well under the $900 billion President Obama had suggested.”

If the right coverage figure for the Baucus bill was $829 billion, then we ought to be focusing on the $1.055 trillion coverage cost in the House bill.

And if $829 billion is not, in fact, the right measure, when did the goalposts move?

P.S. I will follow up shortly with a second concern about the cost discussion: that there are non-coverage items in the bill that cost substantial sums. That’s why I previously argued that the Baucus bill actually cost a smidgen more than $900 billion.

Update: Both Roll Call and the AP are using the more than $1 trillion figure.

Talking Health on CNBC

When I worked for the White House, I discovered that you could learn a lot about your co-workers — or, at least, their portfolios — by their TV habits. Some people watched CNBC, some Fox, and some CNN. And some even managed to get through the work day without turning their TVs on.

I have always been firmly in the CNBC contingent, so I was particularly happy to appear on Squawk Box this morning. Here’s a link to a video of the interview (sorry, I still haven’t mastered the embedding of videos from news sites.)

Going in, my main talking points on the health debate were:

  • From a budget perspective, the Baucus bill is much better than the House bill. As Chairman Baucus has said, his bill would increase spending by more than $800 billion over the next ten years. On a comparable basis, the House bill would increase spending by more than $1.5 trillion. That’s a huge difference.
  • My biggest budget concern about the Baucus bill involves the offsets he proposes to pay for those increased costs. Some of those offsets presume that we can make substantial future cuts to payment rates for various Medicare providers. The trillion-dollar question is whether we will actually have the backbone to make those cuts when the time comes. Our recent experiences with doctor payments in Medicare should give us all pause on that front. In addition, there’s the hard question of whether we should be using the “easy” offsets to address our existing fiscal crisis instead.

The Simple Economics of Student Loan Crises

Yesterday, my students heard my second lecture on supply and demand. You know, the one in which we examined how government policies like rent control and the minimum wage can affect market outcomes. Those are important examples, and I dutifully discussed both of them. But I must admit they also feel a smidgen stale – how many millions of students have seen a lecture on rent control and the minimum wage?

To spice things up, I threw in a third example of government intervention: the market for guaranteed student loans. As I mentioned a few weeks ago, the government has a major program in which it provides guarantees for private student loans. Under the program, lenders are protected against the risk of future defaults by the student borrowers. In return for providing these loans, the lenders receive interest payments that are limited by a formula that is specified in law. (These payments are determined completely separately from the amounts that are charged to students which, for simplicity, I will ignore in what follows.)

This program is currently the focus of a major political battle: the Obama administration has proposed eliminating the program and replacing it with direct loans from the government (which currently account for a much smaller portion of the market). But I didn’t get into that larger debate in class. Instead, the reason I focused on this program is that it has experienced two crises in recent years:

  • In 2006 and 2007, the crisis was kickbacks. In their enthusiasm to win more business, private lenders were offering “inducements” to schools and student loan officers in order to get preferred access to students who wanted loans.
  • In 2008, the crisis was a lack of lending. In large part because of the financial crisis, private lenders had no enthusiasm whatsoever for making loans. As a result, there was a real risk that students might not be able to get loans.

As I told my students, I think both of these crises had the same root cause: the fact that the government, rather than market forces, determined how much lenders were paid for making guaranteed student loans. In both cases, the government got the payment levels wrong, and the crises followed soon thereafter.

Continue reading “The Simple Economics of Student Loan Crises”

Wall Street Goes to Washington

A front page story in today’s Washington Post (“In Shift, Wall Street Goes to Washington“) documents the Capital’s rising importance in the financial world:

J.P. Morgan Chase for the first time convened its board in Washington this summer, calling the directors to a meeting at the downtown Hay-Adams hotel, then dispatching them to Capitol Hill for meet-and-greets.

Last month, a firm run by the billionaire investor Wilbur Ross hired the head of Washington’s top mortgage regulator to pick through the wreckage of the housing bust looking for bargains.

And the world’s largest bond fund, Pimco, which has traditionally assessed the risk of any new investment according to five financial criteria, recently added one more: the impact of any change in federal policy.

“In the old days, Washington was refereeing from the sideline,” said Mohamed A. el-Erian, chief executive officer of Pimco. “In the new world we’re going toward, not only is Washington refereeing from the field, but it is also in some respects a player as well. . . . And that changes the dynamics significantly.”

The Ross example doesn’t tell us much — the financial world has always recruited government officials. The J.P. Morgan and Pimco examples, however, highlight how much the playing field has changed over the past two years. Washington is not just a more aggressive regulator. Given the stresses on the system, it has become a serial intervener — stepping in to prop up specific firms or credit channels that appear too important to fail. And it is now a major investor, with a burgeoning portfolio of investments in financial firms, auto companies, and mortgage backed securities.

As we commemorate the first anniversary of the fall of Lehman, it appears that the worst of the financial and economic crisis is behind us. And the policy conversation should increasingly focus on exit strategies. Not just the narrow question of how the Federal Reserve eventually unwinds the extraordinary expansion of its programs. But also how the Treasury eventually unwinds it TARP investments. How the FDIC walks back from offering guarantees on bank debt. How the government restructures Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

And, perhaps most importantly, how policymakers recalibrate their relationship with financial markets. To paraphrase Mohamed A. el-Arian: can Washington return to being a referee on the sidelines or will it continue to be a player?

Bending the Curve: Redefining Health Insurance

Over the past few months, a politically-diverse group of health policy experts has been pondering a key question: what are the “specific, feasible steps” that policymakers could use to reduce the growth of health spending? In short, how can we bend the curve?

The fruits of their labor were published by the Brookings Institution on Tuesday as Bending the Curve: Effective Steps to Reduce Long-Term Health Care Spending Growth.

I encourage everyone interested in health policy to give it a close look.

The report’s recommendations for fixing health insurance particularly caught my eye:

Governments should ensure proper incentives for non-group and small-group health insurance markets to focus on competition based on cost and quality rather than selection. Achieving this requires near-universal coverage and insurance exchanges to pool risk outside of employment, augment choice, and align premium differences with differences in plan costs.

[Therefore, these insurance markets should be restructured to] focus insurer competition on cost and quality through requirements for guaranteed issue without — or with very limited — pre-existing condition exclusions; limited health rating, such as those related to age and behaviors only; and full risk-adjustment of premiums across insurers based on enrollees’ risk. For market stability, these reforms must be undertaken in the context of an enforced mandate that individuals maintain continuous, creditable basic coverage.

In short, the report recommends a combination of an individual mandate and reforms that eliminate both the ability of and the incentive for insurance companies to try to enroll only the healthy and low-cost.

Continue reading “Bending the Curve: Redefining Health Insurance”

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