Tag: Politics

The “Tax Expirers”

Today I had the chance to testify before the Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee about a perennial challenge, the “tax extenders,” which really ought to be known as the “tax expirers.” Here are my opening remarks. You can find my full testimony here.

As you know, the United States faces a sharp “fiscal cliff” at yearend when numerous policy changes occur. If all these changes happen, they will reduce the fiscal 2013 deficit by about $500 billion, according to the Congressional Budget Office, before taking into account any negative feedback from a weaker economy. About one-eighth of that “cliff”—$65 billion—comes from the expiring and expired tax cuts that are the focus of today’s hearing.

In deciding their fate, you should consider the larger problems facing our tax system. That system is needlessly complex, economically harmful, and widely perceived as unfair. It’s increasingly unpredictable. And it fails at its most basic task, raising enough money to pay our bills.

The “expirers” often worsen these problems. They create uncertainty, complicate compliance, and cost needed revenue. Some make the tax code less fair, some more fair. Some weaken our economy, while others strengthen it.

Fundamental tax reform would, of course, be the best way to address these concerns. But such reform isn’t likely soon.

So you must again grapple with “the expirers.” As a starting point, let me note that they come in three flavors:

  1.  Tax cuts enacted to address a temporary challenge such as recession, the housing meltdown, or regional disasters.
  2. Tax cuts that have reached a sunset review. Prolonged economic weakness and recent omnibus extensions mean there aren’t that many of these, but they do exist.
  3. Tax cuts that expire to game budget rules. These appear to be the most common. Supporters intend these provisions to be long-lived or permanent, but they haven’t found the budget resources to do so.

To determine which of these policies should be extended and which not, you should consider several factors:

  • Does the provision address a compelling need for government intervention?
  • Does it accomplish its goal effectively and at reasonable cost?
  • Does it make the tax code more or less fair?
  • Do its potential benefits justify the revenue loss or the need for higher taxes elsewhere?

In short, you should subject these provisions to the same standards applied to other policy choices. And in this case, you should keep in mind that most of the so-called “tax extenders” are effectively spending through the tax code. You should thus hold them to the same standards as equivalent spending programs.

You should also reform the way you review expiring tax provisions.

  1. Flip the burden of proof. Today’s standing presumption is that most of these provisions will ultimately be extended. That’s why they are called “the extenders,” even after they have expired. Ultimately, though, we should move to a system in which the presumption, rebuttable to be sure, is that expiring provisions will expire unless supporters can justify their continuation. In short, they should be “the expirers.”
  2. Second, divide them up. Like musk oxen, the beneficiaries of these provisions have realized that there is safety in numbers. They thus do their best to coalesce as a single herd—“the extenders”—and to migrate across the annual legislative tundra with as little individual attention as possible.You should break up the herd. Reviewing each provision in detail may not be practical in a single year, but you can identify specific groups for careful review. For example, you can separate out the stimulus provisions, the charity provisions, the energy provisions, and so on.You should also spread scheduled expirations out over time. If fewer expire each year, you will be able to give each one more attention.
  3. Third, change budget rules for temporary tax cuts. Pay-as-you-go budgeting creates crucial discipline but has an unfortunate side effect: long-term tax policies often get chopped into one-year segments. In addition, 10 years of offsets can be used to pay for a single-year extension.To combat this, you could require that any temporary tax provision be assumed to last no less than five years in the official budget baseline. Proponents would then have to round up enough budget offsets to pay for those five years.In addition, Congress could require that offsets happen over the same years as an extension. That would eliminate situations in which 10 years of offsets pay for a single-year extension.

Fixing Medicare’s Double-Counting Problem

Last week I argued that budgeting for Medicare’s hospital insurance program is flawed. Today, I offer two ways to fix it (and reject a third).

Medicare Part A is one of several federal programs that control spending through a “belt and suspenders” combination of regular program rules (the belt) and an overall limit (the suspenders). But it’s the only one that allows legislated savings to offset the costs of policy changes in other programs and extend the time before the overall limit constrains operations.

Congress can’t increase Social Security payroll taxes to pay for increased health care spending or reduce flood insurance subsidies to pay for tax cuts; in both cases, the resources stay within the affected programs. And when it cuts spending on Medicare Parts B and D to pay for other spending, no one claims those cuts will also postpone the day when trust fund exhaustion will disrupt their operations.

Such double counting is possible only in Medicare Part A. And it’s a real problem, creating needless confusion and reinforcing the sense that Washington plays fast and loose with budget numbers.

Happily, Congress knows how to fix this problem. All it needs to do is apply to Medicare A the practices used by one of the other programs that have “belt and suspenders” budgeting but avoid potential double counting.

One approach would be the rules used by the National Flood Insurance Program. As I discussed in more detail last week, those rules require that any legislated savings remain in the program. Lawmakers can’t reduce NFIP subsidies to pay for new spending in other programs. Instead, any savings are automatically earmarked to pay future NFIP claims that would go unpaid because of the program’s borrowing limit. (For an example, see here.)

This approach brings the overall limit explicitly into the budget. But it makes for weird budgeting. For example, the budget baseline would show Medicare A breaking even over the long run, since the trust fund limit would take precedence over its fundamental deficits.

A better approach would adopt the rules used by Social Security. Those rules show Social Security running deficits far into the future in the budget baseline, but they still take the trust fund seriously when examining new legislation. Any proposed cuts to the program’s spending or increases in its revenues are “off budget”. The Congressional Budget Office reports them, but Congress can’t use them to pay for other spending.

A recent Senate bill provides a telling example. The bill would expand the type of income subject to payroll taxes in order to pay for a one-year extension of low interest rates on student loans. Those low rates would cost $6 billion, but the Senate proposal would raise $9 billion. The bill had to overshoot that much because $3 billion comes from higher Social Security taxes and is thus off limits. Meanwhile, the $6 billion in usable revenues comes from Medicare Part A, which is considered “on budget” despite having a trust fund just like Social Security’s.

That difference highlights the inconsistency in current budgeting. If policymakers believe the Part A trust fund is as sacrosanct as Social Security’s, they should provide the same budgetary protection: Part A savings should be off budget, where they couldn’t be used to pay for health reform, student loans, tax cuts, or anything else outside the hospital insurance program.

If Congress doesn’t believe the trust fund deserves that protection, it should adopt a third approach: make the Part A fund as operationally toothless as the one for Medicare B and D. Those programs spend much more than they receive, so their trust fund has unlimited ability to draw on general revenues. If the same were true for Medicare Part A, program changes could be used to pay for health reform (as they were in 2010) or anything else, just like any other mandatory program. But we wouldn’t have any confusion over whether those changes also extend the program’s ability to operate.

The Social Security and Medicare B and D approaches both make more sense than the mishmash that applies to Medicare A today. I think the Medicare B and D approach is the better of the two, not least because it would put all the parts of Medicare on equal footing. But one could certainly argue for the Social Security approach instead. That’s the discussion we should have now so that we can avoid needless double-counting debates in the future.

P.S. Several readers noted an important qualification to my Social Security discussion in my earlier post. Many experts believe past Social Security surpluses have been used to finance deficits in the rest of the budget and, as a result, Social Security resources have been paying for higher spending or lower revenues elsewhere in government. I agree. My comments in these posts apply only to explicit budgeting decisions, like those in 2010’s health reform or today’s student loan legislation. In that context, Social Security savings cannot be legislatively used to pay for other programs. But they still might have indirect effects. For example, by reducing future unified budget deficits, Social Security savings might weaken future congressional efforts to reduce deficits outside Social Security.

More on “Tribes” and Perception

My recent post on “tribes” inspired some thoughtful reader comments about natural selection and stereotyping, and two book recommendations to steel yourself against your brain’s instinctive us vs. them wiring:

I’ve added both to my aspirational reading pile (if electrons can be piled).

Of note to readers in New York, reader Roger K. also noted the apposite opening of Nina Raine’s latest play:

How Your “Tribe” Affects Your Perception

NPR aired an interesting trio of segments this morning about inconsistency and flip-flopping. I particularly enjoyed Alix Spiegel’s report on Jamie Barden, a psychology professor at Howard University. Barden’s work considers how “tribal” affiliation affects our perceptions of inconsistent behavior by politicians. In one experiment, Barden asked students their view of a hypothetical political operative named Mike who crashed while driving drunk and then, a few weeks later, gave a speech against drunk driving:

Now obviously there are two possible interpretations of Mike’s actions. The first interpretation is that Mike is a hypocrite. Privately he’s driving into poles. Publicly he’s making proclamations. He’s a person whose public and private behavior is inconsistent.

The other interpretation is that Mike is a changed man. Mike had a hard experience. Mike learned. Mike grew.

So when do we see hypocrisy and when do we see growth?

What Barden found is that this decision is based much less on the facts of what happened, than on tribe.

Half the time the hypothetical Mike was described to the students in the study as a Repubican, and half the time he was described as a Democrat.

When participants were making judgments of a Mike who was in their own party, only 16 percent found him to be a hypocrite. When participants were making judgments about a Mike from the opposing party, 40 percent found him to be a hypocrite.

I suspect this is the same phenomenon that leads sports fans to systemtically disagree with referee decisions against their favorite team.

The Coming Budget Showdown of 2012

My latest column at the Christian Science Monitor discusses the many fiscal pressures that will come to a head at the end of the year. Here’s an excerpt:

Start with our tattered tax code, which now contains a six-pack of temporary tax cuts. The largest are the Bush-era cuts originally enacted in 2001 and 2003 that were scheduled to expire in 2010. Rather than decide their fate, President Obama and Congress extended them another two years.

That legislation also included additional tax cuts championed by Mr. Obama and an estate tax compromise, all of which expire – along with the original tax cuts – at the end of 2012.

Then there’s the dreaded alternative minimum tax. It expired Dec. 31, but Congress for years has passed an annual “patch” preventing the AMT from hitting more middle-class families. A hodgepodge of temporary tax breaks known, tellingly, as the “extenders,” also expired at the end of last year, but many lawmakers and beneficiaries want to bring them back. Various stimulus measures, including the payroll tax holiday and corporate investment incentives, are set to lapse soon, too.

If those six tax-cut packages expire, annual federal tax revenues would rise by about $1 trillion annually, the Congressional Budget Office projects [See correction below]. It’s hard to imagine that lawmakers will actually let that happen. As the CBO itself notes, such a sharp increase would weaken the economy at a time when it’s struggling to recover from the Great Recession.

On the spending side of the ledger, the most egregious example of can-kicking is the formula by which Medicare sets payments for doctors. That formula has called for dramatic cuts for years. But every time those cuts come near, Congress overrides them temporarily, and often “pays for” that by scheduling even bigger cuts in the future. That’s why doctors face a 27 percent cut in payment rates at the end of March and more in years ahead.

And then there are the roughly $1 trillion in across-the-board spending cuts, spread over nine years, that are scheduled to begin next January. Congress didn’t really intend those cuts to happen; instead, they were meant to pressure last year’s “super committee” to find real budget savings. That didn’t occur, and now Washington is rife with speculation that policymakers will flinch from letting the cuts go through, at least until the economy strengthens.


We will also hit the debt limit again late in 2012 or early in 2013. Add it all up, and there’s quite the fiscal showdown looming for later this year.

Correction: That sentence leaves the wrong impression. It makes it sound like the six tax items add up to $1 trillion in annual revenue, but that is not correct (ht Loren A.). My apologies for missing this during editing. Here’s the full explanation from the first draft of my column:

The expiration of those six packages of tax cuts, plus the arrival of some new taxes created in the health reform legislation, would boost tax revenues sharply in the next few years. The Congressional Budget Office projects that tax revenues will increase from $2.3 trillion in fiscal 2011 to $3.3 trillion in 2014 if all these scheduled changes occur. That trillion-dollar increase, a 44 percent gain, would far outstrip the expected 11 percent growth of the economy.

In short, the $1 trillion increase reflects the six tax items, new taxes from health reform, and the growing (we hope) economy. Sorry for the confusion.

Five Principles for Fixing America’s Tax System

The International Economy recently invited me to contribute to a forum on how best to fix America’s tax system. Here’s my piece; for eleven other views, check out the complete forum.

America’s tax system is a mess. It’s needlessly complicated, economically harmful, and often unfair. And it doesn’t raise enough money to pay our bills. That’s why almost everyone agrees that tax reform should be a top priority. Democrats, Republicans, and independents. Accountants, lawyers, and economists. Elected officials and ordinary citizens. All know our tax system is deeply flawed.

Unfortunately, they don’t agree on how to fix it. Some want revenue-neutral tax reform, while others want higher revenues to cut deficits and pay for rising entitlement spending. Some want to fix the income tax, while others want to tax consumption. Some want to cut tax rates across the board, while others would lift rates for high earners.

Public discourse, meanwhile, is hung up on the idea of attacking “loopholes” when the real action is in tax breaks that benefit millions of taxpayers. Tax reform isn’t just about corporate jets or carried interest. It’s about the mortgage interest deduction, the tax exemption for employer provided health insurance, and generous tax incentives for debt-financed corporate investment. Those policies have major flaws, but they are not loopholes. They reflect fundamental economic and social choices, and they benefit well-defined constituencies.

Tax reform will thus involve a prolonged political struggle, as reformers seek some compromise that can attract enough support to overcome the inevitable inertia against change. That won’t be easy, but given our sky-rocketing debt, weak recovery, and flawed tax system, it’s clearly worth the effort.

Even as they seek a reasonable compromise, reformers should continue to articulate their visions of an ideal tax system. Mine would reflect five principles. First, the government should raise enough money to pay its bills. That likely means higher revenues, relative to GDP, than we’ve had historically. Second, it’s better to tax bads rather than goods. That means greater reliance on energy and environmental taxes. Third, it’s better to tax consumption than income; policymakers should thus limit how much they tax saving and investment. Fourth, the tax burden should be shared equitably both across income levels and among people of similar means who make different choices (for example, renting versus owning a home).

Finally, the best tax systems have a broad base and low rates. Policymakers should thus emphasize cutting tax breaks rather than raising tax rates. Indeed, some rates, like the 35 percent rate on corporate profits, should come down.

To afford such cuts, policymakers should go after the dozens of deductions, credits, exclusions, and exemptions that complicate the code and narrow the tax base, often with little economic or social gain. Many of these provisions have been sold as tax cuts, but are really spending in disguise. They should get the same scrutiny that policymakers devote to traditional spending programs.

Happy Anniversary, Tax Reform

Twenty-five years ago today, President Ronald Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 into law.

Happy silver anniversary, tax reform!

Over at the Tax Policy Center, Len Burman and Gene Steuerle, both Treasury staffers at the time, and Howard Gleckman, who covered the proceedings for BusinessWeek, offer personal reflections on how TRA86 happened and what that means for today’s efforts.

Gene offers a recipe for increasing the odds of productive tax reform:

If there is any lesson from TRA86, it is that  real reform requires channeling forces and information in the right  direction.

Put more broadly, it isn’t helpful to  try to recreate  historical circumstances to get the same outcome.   It is far more useful to understand how to  convert luck into serendipity to increase the odds that good things will happen.

In a recent testimony and a Tax Notes article, I outlined ten steps that increased the chances of reform in 1986 and for the most part are repeatable today.  These include;  seize today’s, not yesterday’s opportunities; rely on principles like equal justice under the law to determine what should be done; make reform comprehensive, in part, because the political cost is likely to be the same in any case; shift the burden of proof to those opposing the better system; form liberal-conservative coalitions in areas where both sides can gain something;  plan strategies in advance for  how to best present the proposals and their effects  to the public; empower nonpartisan staffs like Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy and the Joint Committee on Taxation (who really assembled the ’86  reform); establish leadership on a variety of fronts;  insure accountability so that very specific political leaders bear a significant cost if reform fails; and empower someone to run with the ball and strategize on how to make reform happen.

In 1984 through 1986, much of the political leadership came late to  the game.  And some of the lessons of 1986  were learned, not planned. For example, one key to passage was that at each step in the process, first Treasury Secretary Don Regan, then House Ways & Means Committee Chair Dan Rostenkowski, and finally Senate Finance Committee Chair Bob Packwood feared they would be blamed if the bill failed. As a result, each worked extremely hard to  make sure that tax reform did not die on their watch.

Len agrees on the need, but is feeling a bit more gloomy:

Tax reform has never been more necessary, it’s hard to see a solution to our budget problems without it, and it’s just impossible.

And Howard points to the president–whoever that might be–as the key to the Tax Reform Act of 2013:

Tax reform will make nearly everyone mad. Big-bucks subsidies will be slashed or killed. Political demagoguery will run wild. The Reagan Administration saw that reform would only work if it began with a very specific plan that the White House owned. And President Reagan eventually became its best salesman. My Tax Policy Center colleague Gene Steuerle—who helped write TRA 86—always says the secret to success in Washington is writing the first draft. Put it this way: President Obama’s health reform strategy, which left the dirty work to Congress, is not the way to go.

Taxes and Energy Policy

Last week I had the opportunity to testify before two Ways and Means subcommittees–Select Revenue Measures and Oversight–about the way our tax system is used as a tool of energy policy. Here are my opening remarks. You can find my full testimony here.

As you know, our tax system is desperately in need of reform. It’s needlessly complex, economically harmful, and often unfair. Because of a plethora of temporary tax cuts, it’s also increasingly unpredictable.

We can and should do better.

The most promising path to reform is to reexamine the many tax preferences in our code. For decades, lawmakers have used the tax system not only to raise revenues to pay for government activities, but also to pursue a broad range of social and economic policies. These policies touch many aspects of life, including health insurance, home ownership, retirement saving, and the topic of today’s hearing, energy production and use.

These preferences often support important policy goals, but they have a downside. They narrow the tax base, reduce revenues, distort economic activity, complicate the tax system, force tax rates to be higher than they otherwise would be, and are often unfair. Those concerns have prompted policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum—including, most notably, the Bowles-Simpson commission—to recommend that tax preferences be cut back. The resulting revenue could then be used to lower tax rates, reduce future deficits, or some combination of the two.

In considering such proposals, lawmakers should consider how tax reform, fiscal concerns, and energy policy interact.  Six factors are particularly important.

  • Our tax system needs a fundamental overhaul. Every tax provision, including those related to energy, deserves close scrutiny to determine whether its benefits exceed its costs. Such a review will reveal that many tax preferences should be reduced, redesigned, or eliminated.
  • The code includes numerous energy tax preferences. The Treasury Department, for example, recently identified 25 types of energy preferences worth about $16 billion in 2011. These include incentives for renewable energy sources, traditional fossil fuel sources, and energy efficiency. In addition, energy companies are also eligible for several tax preferences that are available more broadly, such as the domestic production credit.
  • Tax subsidies are an imperfect way of pursuing energy and environmental policy goals. Such subsidies do encourage greater use of targeted energy resources. But, as I discuss in greater detail in my written testimony, they do so in an economically wasteful manner. Subsidies require, for example, that the government play a substantial role in picking winners and losers among energy technologies. The associated revenue losses also require higher taxes or larger deficits.
  • A key political challenge for reform is that energy tax subsidies are often viewed as tax cuts. It makes more sense, however, to view them as spending through the tax code. Reducing such subsidies would make the government smaller even though tax revenues, as conventionally measured, would increase.
  • Tax subsidies are not created equal. Production incentives reward businesses for producing desired energy and are agnostic about what mix of capital, labor, and materials firms use to accomplish that. Investment incentives, in contrast, reward businesses merely for making qualifying investments and encourage firms to use relatively more capital than labor. For both reasons, production incentives tend to be more efficient than investment incentives.
  • Well-designed taxes can typically address the negative effects of energy use more effectively and at lower cost than can tax subsidies. I understand that higher gasoline taxes or a new carbon tax are not popular ideas in many circles, but please bear with me. As I explain at length in my written testimony, well-designed energy taxes are a much more pro-market way of addressing energy concerns than are tax subsidies. Taxes take full advantage of market forces and, in so doing, can accomplish policy goals at least cost and with minimal government intervention. Subsidies, in contrast, make much less use of market forces and inevitably require the government to pick winners and losers. Energy taxes also generate revenue that lawmakers can use to cut other taxes or to reduce deficits.

P.S. Not surprisingly, that last point wasn’t picked up by anyone else, at least during my panel (one of three at the hearing). New energy taxes would, of course, be problematic for the macroeconomy if enacted immediately. And we’d have to make some adjustment, either in the tax code or in benefit programs, to offset the impact on low-income families. In the long-run, however, I think that would be a much better way to address many energy concerns, including carbon emissions and oil dependence. But that’s not the way our system works. Instead, as noted, it’s much more popular to use tax preferences, whose benefits are visible and whose costs are obscure, to pursue energy and environmental goals. Other participants discussed the particular incentives, existing and proposed, in greater detail; their testimony is available here.

More Budget Foxes, Fewer Hedgehogs

My latest column at the Christian Science Monitor:

America’s fiscal challenges are often portrayed as a conflict between hawks and doves. The real battle, however, is between foxes and hedgehogs.

Unfortunately, fiscal hedgehogs still have the upper paw.

“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,” wrote the ancient Greek poet Archilochus. Both foxes and hedgehogs play important roles in the policy ecosystem in normal times. In times of great change, however, society needs more foxes and fewer hedgehogs. More citizens and leaders who can adapt to new conditions, and fewer who want to preserve the status quo.

That’s where we find ourselves today. Despite all the anguish over a debt limit deal, America’s fiscal outlook remains daunting. Little progress has been made on our largest budget challenges. Despite bipartisan efforts, prospects for a grand fiscal bargain remain dim.

One reason is that fiscal hedgehogs still have the upper paw on key issues.

Consider entitlements. Everyone knows that entitlement spending is our No. 1 long-term budget challenge. Because of an aging population and rising health-care costs, spending on Social Security and federal health programs will explode. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that over the next 25 years spending on these programs will rise from roughly 10 percent of the economy to almost 17 percent. Accommodating that growth would require substantial cuts in other government programs, much higher tax revenues, or unsustainable deficits and debt.

The challenge is to find ways to keep the core benefits of these programs while reining in costs. This is where entitlement hedgehogs and foxes part company.

The hedgehogs know one big thing: These programs provide major benefits. Social Security, for example, has dramatically reduced poverty among seniors and provides essential income to millions of retirees.

Inspired by that one big thing, hedgehogs oppose any benefit reductions, such as increasing the eligibility age or trimming benefits to reflect increased longevity.

Entitlement foxes have a more nuanced view. They recognize, like the hedgehogs, the value of the guaranteed retirement income that Social Security provides. But they also know that the number of retirees receiving benefits is growing faster than the number of workers paying payroll taxes. They know that Americans are living longer but retiring earlier. They know, in short, that the future will be different from the past and that the program needs to evolve to remain sustainable. Foxes are thus open to ideas like raising the eligibility age or changing the benefit formula.

A similar dichotomy exists with taxes. Revenue hedgehogs know one big thing: Taxes place a burden on taxpayers and the economy. Thus, they oppose all tax increases, even efforts to reduce the many tax breaks that complicate our tax code.

Revenue foxes see things differently. They recognize the burden that taxes place on taxpayers and the economy. But they also know that tax increases are not all created equal. Higher tax rates, for example, are usually worse for the economy than cutting back on tax breaks. Indeed, cutting tax breaks sometimes frees taxpayers to make decisions based on real economic considerations rather than taxes, thus strengthening the economy. That’s why revenue foxes support eliminating many tax breaks.

Fiscal hedgehogs will never embrace such changes. To make progress, we need more fiscal foxes.

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