Health – Page 7 – Donald Marron

Health Insurance and Labor Markets

Health insurance is not just a health issue. It’s also a jobs issue. Why? Because about 60% of non-elderly Americans get their health insurance through an employer or a labor union. As a result, health insurance and employment are closely related.

As lawmakers consider changes to our system of health insurance, they should therefore keep an eye on the potential implications for jobs and wages. To help them do so, the Congressional Budget Office yesterday released a very helpful brief (see also the accompanying blog entry) that discusses many of the linkages between health insurance and the labor market.

Among other things, CBO reiterates a point I’ve made previously: that the costs of health insurance are ultimately born by workers through lower wages and salaries:

Although employers directly pay most of the costs of their workers’ health insurance, the available evidence indicates that active workers—as a group—ultimately bear those costs. Employers’ payments for health insurance are one form of compensation, along with wages, pension contributions, and other benefits. Firms decide how much labor to employ on the basis of the total cost of compensation and choose the composition of that compensation on the basis of what their workers generally prefer. Employers who offer to pay for health insurance thus pay less in wages and other forms of compensation than they otherwise would, keeping total compensation about the same.

CBO then goes on to discuss a range of potential policies, including ones that would impose new costs on employers. Such policies might require employers to provide health insurance to their workers (an employer mandate), for example, or might levy a fee on employers who don’t provide health insurance (play or pay). CBO concludes that, consistent with the argument above, employers would generally pass the costs of such measures on to their employees through lower wages and salaries. Such adjustments won’t happen instantly, so there may be some short-term effect on employment, but over time the cost will primarily be born by workers through lower compensation.

One exception, however, would be workers who currently earn low wages. As noted on the blog:

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CLASS Act Fails the Offset Test

If you take budgeting seriously, people sometimes think you are a curmudgeon. When I was at the Congressional Budget Office, for example, we were once denounced as anti-housing because we concluded that increasing subsidies for low-income housing wasn’t free. CBO reached that conclusion using an advanced tool known as “arithmetic”, but some advocates tried to portray it as an anti-housing policy statement.

At the risk of again appearing curmudgeonly, I would like to draw your attention to a provision in the health care reform bill being considered by the Senate HELP Committee. That provision, the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act, would create a new program to insure participants against some of the financial costs of disability and long-term care.

I have nothing to say about the merits of this provision, except to note that it has one of the best acronyms in legislative history: the CLASS Act.

I have a great deal to say, however, about the arithmetic of the CLASS Act, because it illustrates just how hard it will be for our legislative process to really pay for health care reform.

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CBO on the New HELP Bill

On Thursday evening, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a preliminary analysis of the latest version of Title I of the Affordable Health Choices Act, commonly known as the HELP bill or the Kennedy bill (since it’s the product of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions which Senator Kennedy chairs).

Based on a quick review, here are the top six things I think you should know about the cost estimate:

1. The analysis is preliminary. CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation have not yet had time to analyze every provision in the bill, some provisions remain in flux, and new provisions may be added. Health policy continues to be a moving target.

2. The headline cost of the bill — about $600 billion over ten years — is significantly lower than the $1 trillion net cost of the previous version of the bill. The net costs declined because (i) the subsidies for coverage through health insurance exchanges are now smaller, (ii) employers would have to pay a penalty if they do not offer insurance to their workers, and (iii) it would be much harder for employees to get subsidies in the exchange if their employer offers health insurance.

Note: The new CBO tables cover Title I of the bill, which has a net budget cost of $597 billion. CBO had earlier scored other portions of the bill as costing $14 billion. As a result, you will hear some commentators using the $597 billion figure and others using $611 billion.

3. As usual, it’s important to unpack the headline cost into its constituent parts: the 10-year cost of expanding health insurance coverage in Title I is about $743 billion and a separate provision adds an additional $10 billion. That $753 billion cost is then partially offset by penalties on employers who don’t offer coverage to their workers ($52 billion), penalties on uninsured individuals ($36 billion), higher income and payroll taxes ($10 billion), and the net premiums generated by a program (CLASS) to provide long-term care insurance ($58 billion). The income and payroll tax offset is much smaller than in the previous version of the bill because the current draft would have a much smaller impact on employer-provided health insurance.

4. The bill includes provisions for a public plan, but CBO concludes that these provisions would “not have a substantial effect on the cost or enrollment projections.” CBO reaches that conclusion because “the public plan would pay providers of health care at rates comparable to privately negotiated rates–and thus was not projected to have premiums lower than those charged by private insurance plans in the exchanges.” In short, the reduced cost of the bill is due to the factors outlined in the previous paragraph, not to the public plan.

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Paying for Health Reform III

Last week I published two posts expressing concern about how Congress might pay for proposed health reforms. The first post argued that policymakers should focus on the trajectory of new spending and offsets, not just the cumulative 10-year budget scores. The second post expressed concern that the offsets used to pay for health reform may include policies that otherwise would have been used to reduce our out-of-control deficits; as a result health reform that appears to be “paid for” could nonetheless worsen our long-run budget trajectory.

Needless to say, these issues are receiving lots of attention around the budgeting parts of the Web. Some important contributions include:

Over at EconomistMom, Diane Lim Rogers elaborates on the challenge of paying for health reform. Diane even boldly suggests — not to endorse, but to make a key point about budgeting –that the most effective way of offsetting new health spending might be to not do it.

Over at the eponymous KeithHennessey.com, Keith Hennessey points out something I missed. In a Financial Times piece on June 22, OMB Director Peter Orszag suggested that paying for health reform over a 10-year budget window isn’t enough for budget neutrality. That’s exactly the point I made in my first post. Peter then sets out a second requirement: that health care reform must be “deficit neutral in the 10th year alone.” This is a good step, since it would rule out some trajectories of spending that would obviously worsen the long-run deficit. As Keith points out, this requirement isn’t sufficient by itself: you need to worry about the entire trajectory of spending and offsets, not just a single year. Nonetheless, it is a very good sign that the Administration is pointing out the limitations of 10-year budget scores.

The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget is publishing a series of papers on paying for health reform. Their June 18 release includes a quite comprehensive list of potential policy changes that could be used as health “pay fors.“

Health is an R&D Problem

Our health care system is notoriously inefficient. Spending is too high, while quality is too low. Some patients undergo expensive treatments that provide little or no benefit. At the same time, other patients don’t receive some inexpensive treatments that could materially improve their health.

When I was CFO of a medical software start-up back in 2000, we diagnosed this problem quite simply: actual medical practice falls far short of best practices. Good treatment regimes are often well-known, yet are overlooked by a large fraction of practicing physicians. (The classic example at the time was that doctors were substantially under-prescribing beta blockers, which can help many patients after a heart attack; I would welcome comments about whether that’s still true.)

The implied treatment for our health care system is also simple: find ways to get patients, physicians, and other providers to adopt best practices. We were focused on information technology as one potential way to do this, but many others have also gotten attention, including:

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Paying for Health Reform II

Yesterday, I suggested that policymakers should take care in how they pay for any health reform. Paying for reform over the next ten years, which appears to be the consensus budgetary goal, is laudable but not enough. Policymakers should also make sure that reform doesn’t worsen the longer-run trajectory of our over-stretched federal budget.

As I noted, the Congressional Budget Office made a similar point in an important letter last week. Today, I’d like to emphasis another crucial point that CBO made in that letter — one that I think deserves much greater attention than it has received thus far.

Regarding the offsets that might be used to finance new health-related spending, CBO wrote:

Moreover, any savings in existing federal programs that were used to finance a significant expansion of health insurance would not be available to reduce future budget deficits. In light of the unsustainable path of the federal budget under current law, using savings to finance new programs instead of reducing the deficit would necessitate even stronger policy actions in other areas of the budget.

In other words, it’s likely that policymakers will pick the low-hanging fruit — the least-painful tax increases and spending reductions — to offset the costs of new health spending. That certainly makes sense politically, but unfortunately it may also make it that much harder to address our long-run budget problems.

Paying for Health Reform

Lawmakers want to be sure that health care reform — if it happens — won’t worsen the deficit over the next ten years. That’s laudable, but it’s not enough. There’s a risk that reform could be paid for over ten years, yet still worsen our long-run budget crisis. Policymakers should therefore focus on the long-run trajectory of new spending and offsets, not just the 10-year budget scores.

Faced with a frightening budget situation, lawmakers have rightly decided that health care reform — if it happens — should be budget neutral. In practice, that means that any new spending from health reform should be paid for — by other spending reductions or by increases in tax revenues — over a 10-year budget window.

That’s a laudable goal, but it’s not enough.

We also need to ensure that health reform doesn’t worsen our already grim long-run budget situation. Unfortunately, that could easily happen, even if its costs are paid for over the next ten years. To illustrate, consider the following stylized example. The red line is a hypothetical path for the net costs of health reform, and the blue line is a hypothetical path for the offsets that would be used to pay for that reform. I’ve chosen the numbers so that health reform costs $1 trillion over ten years, and so that the offsets total to $1 trillion over the same period.

This combination of policies would satisfy the “budget neutrality” test – the value of the offsets would indeed offset the net costs of the health reform. Nevertheless, it would substantially widen the deficit after several years, since the annual amount of new spending would eventually exceed the annual amount of offsets. If those trends continued, reform would not really be budget neutral; instead, it would exacerbate the long-term budget crisis.

The importance of this concern was highlighted by the Congressional Budget Office last week.

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Competitiveness & Health Reform

This morning, the Wall Street Journal editorial page questioned the oft-alleged link between health care costs and the competitiveness of American business. Echoing Council of Economic Advisers Chair Christina Romer, it referred to that argument as “schlock.” At the same time, everyone interested in health policy is still absorbing the trillion-dollar price tag that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put on the Kennedy health bill.

I’d like to point out that these two issues – any link between health care and competitiveness and the estimated cost of health reform – are closely related. The way that CBO estimated the budget impacts of the Kennedy bill implies that health care has little effect on competitiveness. If you take the contrary view, that health care is a big deal for American competitiveness, then you should also believe that CBO has underestimated the difficulty of paying for health reform.

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CBO on the Kennedy Health Bill

On Monday afternoon, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a preliminary analysis of the Affordable Health Choices Act, commonly known as the Kennedy Health Bill. The draft bill language was distributed last week by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) which Senator Kennedy chairs.

Based on work by CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the analysis provides preliminary estimates of the budget impact of the bill as well as its impacts on health insurance coverage. Some highlights:

1. The analysis is preliminary. CBO and JCT have not yet had time to analyze every provision in the bill, some provisions remain in flux, and new provisions may be added. In short, health policy is a moving target.

2. The bill would have a net budgetary cost of slightly more than $1 trillion over the next ten years (2010 – 2019). To get the bill passed, its proponents will have to find a way to offset most or all of those costs. That’s why President Obama and others have been talking about various spending reductions (e.g., reduced payment rates for some providers) and revenue increases (e.g., reducing the benefit of itemized deductions) in recent days. As a political matter, the offsets may turn out to be more difficult than the core policy.

3. The bill would increase Federal spending by $1.3 trillion, which would be partially offset by about $260 billion in higher tax revenues; the net cost is slightly more than $1 trillion. Spending would increase primarily because the Federal government would provide subsidies for individuals and families to purchase health insurance through insurance exchanges (also known as gateways). Revenues would increase because fewer workers would receive employer-sponsored health insurance (which is not subject to income and payroll taxes). Those workers would still be compensated at market rates, but more of their compensation would be in taxable forms (e.g., wages and salaries).

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