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Archive for the ‘Finance’ Category

Sweden is rightly admired for the way it handled its banking crisis in the early 1990s (and its ensuing fiscal challenges).

In yesterday’s Financial Times, Dag Detter looks back for some lessons for Europe as it struggles to resolve its current banking crisis:

When the Swedish banking system crashed in 1992, the government faced an  identical problem. Yet in the end, Sweden’s taxpayers came very well out of  their experience of bank ownership. How was this achieved, and what lessons can  be learnt for Madrid and the EU’s new bank resolution policy?

First, move fast. Spain and bankers have  been in denial about the scale of bad lending for too long. The Rajoy  government rightly came to office this year on a promise to force banks to write  down bad loans. The situation has predictably turned out to be much worse than  assumed, but their policy is the right one. Painful as it is, transparency on  the scale of bad debt is vital for the market to be confident that it  understands risk and uncertainty  in Spain and can therefore price it properly.

Catharsis can come only with a purge of bad assets. Banks should present  plans to handle problem assets, strengthen controls and improve efficiency. This  might require government or even supranational assistance in the orderly closure  of moribund institutions. In addition, “bad” bank parts must be demerged from  the “healthy” to facilitate recapitalisation. The state should never be left  holding the junk while the healthy part of a bank wriggles free.

Second, maintain commercial principles. In Sweden, each state bank investment  was made on what would have been commercial terms in a normal market, always  with the aim of maintaining competitive neutrality. The terms of the investment  must be structured in a way that gives the bank and its owners no grounds to  request more state funding than is necessary, combined with the incentives to  facilitate a swift exit. Yet it must be sufficient to ensure that the bank can  return to profitability without additional government assistance.

The whole piece is worth a read.

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“American investors lack basic financial literacy,” according to a new report from the Securities and Exchange Commission (much of which is based on an earlier report by the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress). Many fail to grasp compound interest, don’t understand fees and other investment costs, and aren’t aware about the risks of investment fraud.

From the report summary:

According to the Library of Congress Report, studies show consistently that American investors lack basic financial literacy. For example, studies have found that investors do not understand the most elementary financial concepts, such as compound interest and inflation. Studies have also found that many investors do not understand other key financial concepts, such as diversification or the differences between stocks and bonds, and are not fully aware of investment costs and their impact on investment returns. Moreover, based on studies cited in the Library of Congress Report, investors lack critical knowledge about investment fraud. In addition, surveys demonstrate that certain subgroups, including women, African-Americans, Hispanics, the oldest segment of the elderly population, and those who are poorly educated, have an even greater lack of investment knowledge than the average general population. The Library of Congress Report concludes that “low levels of investor literacy have serious implications for the ability of broad segments of the population to retire comfortably, particularly in an age dominated by defined-contribution retirement plans.”

The report goes on to discuss ideas for increasing financial literacy and increasing the transparency of fees and other investment costs.

People sometimes talk about financial literacy as though the goal is helping people choose their own investments. That can be helpful, but the report rightly discusses another goal: improving consumers’ ability to work with financial advisors.

P.S. For a brief discussion of financial literacy and mortgages, see this post from 2010.

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The Rise of Trading Quote Spam

On Monday, I posted a lovely animated gif from Nanex showing the rise of high-frequency trading. What I failed to mention is that graph doesn’t show completed trades. It shows quotes.

And according to another nice chart from Nanex, it’s high-frequency quoting that has skyrocketed (left chart), not trading (right):

As Nanex explains:

Each day is plotted in a separate color over the course of a trading day (9:30 to 16:00 Eastern): older data uses colors towards the violet end of the spectrum, recent data towards the red end of the spectrum. The gaps you see between color groups on the quote chart (left-side) is when system capacity was upgraded to handle the increase in traffic, and quote spam jumped to fill the new capacity that very same day.

The number of unexecuted quotes, many allegedly not intended to be executed, has thus skyrocketed.

France recently took steps to try to deter the rise in quotes. In addition to a financial transactions tax it, France will also impose a tax on traders who submit too many unfilled quotes.

In short, France will levy a financial non-transaction tax.

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High frequency trading (HFT) has taken off like wildfire in recent years. Nowhere is that better illustrated than in this stunning animated GIF from Nanex, a provider of streaming market data (ht: Felix Salmon).

The gif shows the rise in HFT or algorithmic trading from 2007 through early 2012. It doesn’t capture last week’s meltdown at Knight Capital, but you can see many other seminal events of recent years.

I find it strangely beautiful, like watching a fire build.

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Over at the Economist, Greg Ip points us to a new IMF working paper that surveys all the systemic banking crises–147 in all–since 1970. As Greg notes, one of Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia’s most striking findings is that banking crises disproportionately begin in the second half of the year, with a particular spike in September:

So let’s enjoy what few days of June remain.

P.S. Theories to explain this pattern are appreciated. Or maybe it’s a spurious correlation, at Tyler Cowen hints.

Update: Joshua Hedlund at PostLibertarian crunches the underlying data and finds that (a) the authors provided a date for only 63 of the crises and (b) that 22 of the 25 in September happened in 2008.  ht: Tyler Cowen

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My Twitter feed lit up yesterday with folks recommending a speech by George Soros about Europe[Link subsequently stopped working, but now it's back.] They were right. Whether you love him or hate him, he provides a fascinating perspective on Europe’s past, present, and future and, in so doing, provides a particularly clear presentation of his critique of (what he views as) mainstream economics.

The whole speech is worth a read. Here are some excerpts describing his view that the European Union is a bubble:

Among other things, I developed a model of a boom-bust process or bubble which is endogenous to financial markets, not the result of external shocks. According to my theory, financial bubbles are not a purely psychological phenomenon. They have two components: a trend that prevails in reality and a misinterpretation of that trend. A bubble can develop when the feedback is initially positive in the sense that both the trend and its biased interpretation are mutually reinforced. Eventually the gap between the trend and its biased interpretation grows so wide that it becomes unsustainable. After a twilight period both the bias and the trend are reversed and reinforce each other in the opposite direction. Bubbles are usually asymmetric in shape: booms develop slowly but the bust tends to be sudden and devastating. That is due to the use of leverage: price declines precipitate the forced liquidation of leveraged positions.

I contend that the European Union itself is like a bubble. In the boom phase the EU was what the psychoanalyst David Tuckett calls a “fantastic object” – unreal but immensely attractive. The EU was the embodiment of an open society –an association of nations founded on the principles of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in which no nation or nationality would have a dominant position.

The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They recognized that perfection is unattainable; so they set limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilized the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step. The process fed on its own success, very much like a financial bubble. That is how the Coal and Steel Community was gradually transformed into the European Union, step by step.

Germany used to be in the forefront of the effort. When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany’s leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were willing to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement. At that time, German statesmen used to assert that Germany has no independent foreign policy, only a European one.

The process culminated with the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro. It was followed by a period of stagnation which, after the crash of 2008, turned into a process of disintegration. The first step was taken by Germany when, after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Angela Merkel declared that the virtual guarantee extended to other financial institutions should come from each country acting separately, not by Europe acting jointly. It took financial markets more than a year to realize the implication of that declaration, showing that they are not perfect.

The Maastricht Treaty was fundamentally flawed, demonstrating the fallibility of the authorities. Its main weakness was well known to its architects: it established a monetary union without a political union. The architects believed however, that when the need arose the political will could be generated to take the necessary steps towards a political union.

But the euro also had some other defects of which the architects were unaware and which are not fully understood even today. In retrospect it is now clear that the main source of trouble is that the member states of the euro have surrendered to the European Central Bank their rights to create fiat money. … Due to the divergence in economic performance Europe became divided between creditor and debtor countries. This is having far reaching political implications … .

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Harvard Business School professor Mihir Desai believes American companies and investment firms have erred–horribly–by linking manager compensation so tightly to financial market performance. In the current Harvard Business Review, he identifies this as a giant FIB, a Financial Incentive Bubble:

American capitalism has been transformed over the past three decades by the idea that financial markets are suited to measuring performance and structuring compensation. Stock-based pay for corporate executives and high-powered incentive contracts for investment managers have dramatically altered incentives on both sides of the capital market. Unfortunately, the idea of compensation based on financial markets is both remarkably alluring and deeply flawed: It seems to link pay more closely to performance, but it actually rewards luck and can incentivize dangerous risk-taking. This system has contributed significantly to the twin crises of modern American capitalism: governance failures that cast doubt on the stewardship abilities of U.S. managers and investors, and rising income inequality.

Mihir has nothing against well-functioning financial markets. He emphasizes that they “play a vital role in economic growth by ensuring the most efficient allocations of capital,” and he believes that capable managers and investors should be “richly rewarded” when their talents are truly evident.

The problem is that incentive compensation based on financial performance does a lousy job of distinguishing skill from luck. In finance-speak, managers and investors often get rewarded for taking on beta, when their pay really ought to be linked to alpha. In practice, luck gets rewarded with undeserved windfalls (that are by no means offset by negative windfalls for the unlucky). And that, he argues, results in an important ”misallocation of financial, real, and human capital.”

Well worth a read.

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Financial Answers Made Simple

For the past year, I have been advising a start-up, FedWise LLC, that is working to improve American’s financial literacy. (Full disclosure: I have a small interest in the company.)

FedWise’s vision is simple: to provide helpful, unbiased, reliable information to consumers about financial products and services like mortgages and credit cards.

The company recently launched its first two products.

One is a public website, FinFAQs, where visitors can get answers to specific questions. For example, “What are points?” or “What questions can creditors not legally ask me?“. If you are interested, please try it out. FinFAQs is still young, and the team welcomes feedback on the questions, answers, and interface.

The second, the FedWise Answer Engine, allows financial institutions to offer the Qs and As to consumers on their own websites while receiving sales leads and market intelligence. Several banks and credit unions have already signed up for subscriptions. Perhaps needless to say, FedWise is happy to talk to other institutions that might be interested in offering the service to their customers. For more info, click here.

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Ezra Klein surveyed 18 economists for their charts of the year. Here’s my candidate, courtesy of Spiegel Online:

This chart illustrates the end of euro complacency. Investors once acted as though the euro eliminated not just currency risk but sovereign credit risk. All nations–from Greece to Germany–could borrow at the same low rates. No longer. As the financial crisis enters its fifth year, markets are again distinguishing between strong nations and weak.

I subsequently discovered that I am not alone in choosing this chart. The BBC has a version of this as the first entry in its survey of top graphs of the year (with commentary by Vicky Pryce of FTI Consulting), and Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute included it in Derek Thompson’s survey of top graphs over at the Atlantic.

P.S. For the United States, I think Brad DeLong is right: behold the shortfall in nominal U.S. GDP.

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The New York Federal Reserve just posted an entertaining analysis of an “Internet blooper” that struck UAL, the parent company of United Airlines a few years ago. As authors Carlos Carvalho, Nicholas Klagge, and Emanuel Moench note in a blog post:

On September 8, 2008, a six-year-old article about the 2002 bankruptcy of United Airlines’ parent company resurfaced on the Internet and was mistakenly believed to be reporting a new bankruptcy filing by the company. This episode caused the company’s stock price to drop by as much as 76 percent in just a few minutes, before NASDAQ halted trading. After the “news” had been identified as false, the stock price rebounded, but still ended the day 11.2 percent below the previous close. Trading volumes skyrocketed during these extreme price movements. In subsequent days, the stock traded as much as 17 percent below its September 8 closing price, and on September 15 it finally traded above the price level seen just before the false news impacted the market.

In short, it took a week for the stock market to flush the “blooper” out of its system.

They then confirm that result using much more sophisticated techniques that allow them to estimate what UAL’s stock price would have been absent the false news:


For bonus points, they also find that similar, but smaller effects on the stock prices of other major airlines.

ht: Paul Kedrosky.

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